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An Australian Outlook on International Affairs?  
The Evolution of International Relations Theory  
in Australia 
RICHARD DEVETAK 
Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland 
Disciplinary histories of Australian International Relations (IR) theory have tended to focus on 
the 1960s — when a number of Australian scholars returned from the UK to take up posts at 
the Australian National University’s Department of International Relations — as the beginning 
of a discipline that has subsequently flourished through various disciplinary debates and global 
events. This article offers a preliminary attempt at narrating a more complete history of 
Australian IR by beginning to recover much-neglected contributions made in the early interwar 
years. From these earliest years through to the current “era of critical diversity”, it is argued, 
Australian scholars have made considerable contributions not just to the intellectual formation 
of an Australian outlook on international affairs, but to an understanding of international 
relations itself.  
Introduction 
Of the many notable features of the standard historiographical narrative of International 
Relations (IR), one is the total absence of any Australian contribution until the Cold 
War. In his masterful, if flawed, history of the discipline from 1919 to 1969, Hedley 
Bull mentions not a single Australian contribution.1 More recently, Brian Schmidt’s 
pioneering disciplinary history, though focused on the formative years in America, 
mentions many British and European writers, but no Australians in the years between 
1850 and 1950.2 Lucian Ashworth’s valuable study of the “creation” of international 
studies, while focused on the writings of Norman Angell and David Mitrany, includes a 
wide-ranging chapter on the so-called “first great debate” between realism and 
idealism, but again fails to identify a single Australian in the discipline’s formative 
years.3 The same holds true for other disciplinary histories, and for the recent spate of 
                                                 
 I would like to thank Jim George and Michael Wesley for sharing their considerable knowledge of 
Australian IR with me. Thank you also to the two anonymous referees and the journal’s guest editors, 
Alex Bellamy and Sara Davies, for their constructive comments and advice. 
1 Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969” in Brian Porter, ed., The 
Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969 (Oxford, 1972). William C. Olson does, 
however, mention John Burton’s International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge, 1965) as a 
“landmark” publication in the growth of IR as a discipline. See Olson, “The Growth of a Discipline” 
in Porter, Aberystwyth Papers.  
2 Brian Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations (New York, 1998). 
3 Lucian Ashworth, Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition 
(Aldershot, 1999). 
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writings on the interwar years.4 Only on Hedley Bull’s arrival in the late 1960s do 
Australians begin to feature in disciplinary histories of IR.  
There are of course several Australian contemporaries of Bull who would make 
substantial contributions to the discipline at home and abroad from the 1960s onwards, 
pre-eminently including Coral Bell, Arthur Burns, T.B. Millar and J.D.B. Miller. 
Among most historians of the Australian study of IR there is consensus that the 
discipline “matures” or “comes of age” only in the 1960s.5 Indeed, Jim George is no 
doubt right to say: 
[o]ne cannot really speak of an International Relations discipline in Australia until the early 1960s 
when a number of Australian scholars returned from the UK to take up residence in the first 
designated centre of International Relations excellence at the Australian National University 
(ANU) in Canberra.6  
In an otherwise useful recent survey of Australian IR from its humble beginnings in the 
1920s to the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs (AIIA) in 2008, James Cotton inexplicably misinterprets George to be saying 
that “prior to the 1960s Australians wrote no international relations of any interest”.7 
Notwithstanding the fact that George never said anything of the kind, this does beg the 
question of just what was the Australian contribution to IR before the 1960s. Can we 
assume that Australians made no notable contribution to the academic study of 
international relations before Bull? More pointedly, does Bull’s judgment of interwar 
contributions to IR — that “none is worth reading now except for the light it throws on 
the preoccupations and presuppositions of its place and time” — apply to Australian 
contributions too?8  
There is much work to be done before definitive answers can be offered to these 
questions. In the meantime, however, it will be useful to begin setting out some of the 
early Australian contributions to the study of international relations. One of the main 
aims of this article, following Cotton and Michael Wesley, is indeed to begin 
recapturing Australian contributions to IR before the discipline reached its “maturity” 
                                                 
4 On general disciplinary histories see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations (Oxford, 1990), Ch. 2; on interwar history see Andreas Osiander, “Rereading 
Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, 3 
(1998), pp. 409-432; Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate’”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 24, 5 (1998), pp. 1-16; and Joel Quirk, and Darshan Vigneswaran, “The Construction of 
an Edifice: the Story of a First Great Debate”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 1 (2005), 
pp.89-108.  
5 See inter alia, J.D.B. Miller, “The Development of International Studies in Australia, 1933-1983”, 
Australian Outlook, Vol. 37, 3 (1983), pp. 138-142 at p. 141; Martin Indyk, “The Australian Study of 
International Relations” in Don Aitkin, ed., Surveys of Australian Political Science (Sydney, 1985); 
Richard Higgott and Jim George, “Tradition and Change in the Study of International Relations in 
Australia”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 11, 4 (1990), pp. 423-438, at p. 426.  
6 Jim George, “International Relations Theory in an Era of Critical Diversity” in Richard Devetak, 
Anthony Burke and Jim George, eds, An Introduction to International Relations: Australian 
Perspectives (Melbourne, 2007), pp. 38-9. 
7 James Cotton, “Celebrating 75 Years: The Australian Institute of International Affairs and 
Australian International Relations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 62, 4 (2008), 
pp.523-539 at p. 544 
8 Bull, “The Theory of International Politics”, p. 34.  
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in the 1960s.9 So much has been written about the Australian discipline since the 
1960s, and so little of the period before, that this article will focus more of its attention 
on the earlier years.  
This article is structured around three sections, each pertaining to an historical 
period in the development of the Australian discipline. The first section surveys 
Australian writing on international relations in the aftermath of the First World War. 
This was a time when Australia as a nation felt very insecure as a British outpost in the 
Southwest Pacific. But precisely because of this insecurity she remained committed to 
interdependence with other nations through the British Empire and the League of 
Nations even as she pursued her independence. The League’s failure to prevent another 
world war accounts for the intellectual mood shift from more sanguine to more 
pragmatic versions of “institutional internationalism”, which is the subject of the 
second section.10 It was under the prevailing mood of realism that the Australian 
discipline finally “comes of age”, producing scholars of international renown and 
establishing university Chairs and Departments of Politics and International Relations. 
Even so, it was rarely a realism of the power politics or Realpolitik variety; nor was 
Australian IR dominated by the social scientific approach of “behaviouralism” that 
prevailed in the USA. Instead, Australian IR inclined towards the “classical” or 
“traditional” approach that frames its inquiry as an interpretive investigation of the 
rules, norms and moral values that shape the practices and institutions of international 
relations. The final section offers a brief account of the rise of post-positivism in 
Australian IR during the 1980s and 1990s. By this time, the Australian discipline of IR, 
like the nation itself, confidently asserted itself on the international stage. Still 
unconvinced of the analogy between the natural and social sciences, Australian IR has 
become the site of what George calls “an era of critical diversity”, which comprises 
“critical theories” as well as revised versions of realism and the English School theory 
of international society.11  
Insecurity, Independence and Interdependence: Australian IR during the 
Interwar Years 
The interwar years were dominated by the long shadow cast by the First World War 
and its punitive peace settlement, and by the rise and fall of the League of Nations. 
Under this shadow, Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, Italy’s 1935 invasion of 
Abyssinia, and the accession to power of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, all 
revealed “a deepening sense of fear, insecurity and distrust” between states, as W. 
Macmahon Ball noted.12 This was the general global context, but there was a particular 
geopolitical context, of growing insecurity, through which Australia and Australian 
scholars would engage these international political issues. As we shall see, the 
formation of what we might call an “Australian outlook”, to borrow the title given to 
the nation’s first dedicated journal of international affairs, was shaped by growing 
                                                 
9 Cotton, “Celebrating 75 Years”; Michael Wesley, “Foreign and Security Policy” in Rod Rhodes, 
ed., The Australian Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century (London, 2009).  
10 I borrow the term “institutional internationalism” from Caspar Sylvest, “Continuity and Change in 
British Liberal Internationalism, c. 1900-1930”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 2 (2005), 
pp. 263-283. 
11 George, “International Relations Theory in an Era of Critical Diversity”. Also see Richard Devetak 
and Richard Higgott, “International Relations Theory” in Rhodes, The Australian Study of Politics. 
12 W. Macmahon Ball, Possible Peace (Melbourne, 1936), p. 13. 
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awareness of geopolitical trends in Europe and the Asia-Pacific (rising militarism), by 
shifting distributions of power (the slow and reluctant emergence of America from 
isolationism), and by the requirement of a more independent foreign policy catering to 
Australia’s particular security interests. All this made more urgent the need to study 
international affairs as a distinct field of inquiry, though one still informed by 
disciplines such as Political Science, History, Law and Economics.  
An Australian Foreign Policy: Searching for Security in a Changing World 
During the interwar years a rift would develop in Australia’s international outlook 
between those who sought to remain close to Great Britain and those who sought to cut 
or at least loosen the apron-strings.13 The latter would press for closer ties with the 
USA as an indispensable power in the Pacific. But there were those, such as the young 
Keith Hancock, then still at the University of Adelaide, who, by disposition, were 
sceptical of America and the advantages of strategic cooperation with the US. In a 
letter to British historian A.L. Rowse dated 20 November 1926, Hancock confided: 
I don’t want Australia to drift vaguely around the south Pacific, falling under the shadow of the 
Yank-land, or getting blown up by yellow men, or going on her own isolated narrow self-assertive 
way. I want her to become more and more an effective part of the British community.14  
This passage reveals Hancock’s dual loyalties, to Britain and to Australia.15 In this 
Hancock was hardly unique. Nor was he alone in his anxiety over the Japanese, whom 
he disrespectfully called “yellow men”. But for Hancock, writing in the decade or so 
after the First World War, Australia’s future did not lie in building closer ties with 
America. He doubted that the US could “give to Australia the security which she now 
enjoys in virtue of her honourable co-operation with her fellow-members of the British 
Commonwealth”.16 He was also sneering about American business methods and 
scathing of its multiculturalism: “America has too many foreigners and hybrids!”.17 
Though these are views Hancock would later feel rather more uncomfortable about, 
they fairly represent a strong current of Australian thinking in the 1920s and 1930s. But 
such views of Australia’s position in the world would fade by the end of the 1930s as 
more pragmatic and strategic visions exposed the political failings of what was an 
essentially nostalgic outlook of “Greater Britain”.  
One of the stakes in debates during the 1930s was the extent to which Britain’s 
interests would reliably coincide with Australia’s in “a changing world”.18 Australia’s 
habits, interests and sympathies for Britain, to borrow from Hancock,19 could continue, 
but the changing strategic circumstances of Europe and the Asia-Pacific, as well as 
Britain’s limited power projection into the southwest Pacific, compelled Australians to 
cultivate habits, interests and sympathies for the US too. Once the Second World War 
                                                 
13 Miller, “Development of International Studies”, p. 139. 
14 Quoted in Wm. Roger Louis, “Sir Keith Hancock and the British Empire: The Pax Britannica and 
the Pax Americana”, English Historical Review, Vol. CXX, 488 (2005), pp. 937-962 at p. 941. 
15 In fact, elsewhere Hancock adds a third loyalty to the State of Victoria. See his Argument of Empire 
(Harmondsworth, 1943), p. 19. 
16 W.K. Hancock, Australia (London, 1930), p. 217. 
17 Ibid., p. 218. 
18 P.D. Phillips, “Australia in a Changing World” in W.G.K. Duncan, ed., Australia’s Foreign Policy 
(Sydney, 1938), pp. 28-9. 
19 Hancock, Australia, p. 219. 
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broke out, Fred Alexander would confidently assert that there remained “no serious 
prejudices to be broken down between the two nations; […] no deep-rooted suspicions 
to cloud the issue when negotiations between governments begin, or to preclude 
negotiations altogether”.20 That is not to say that closer ties between Australia and the 
US were inevitable. As Alexander showed in his analysis of Australia-US relations, 
there had been several obstacles that first needed to be overcome, including divergent 
views on Japan and the Manchurian question.21 To Washington’s astonishment, 
Canberra was content to appease Japan over its 1931 invasion of Manchuria so as to 
avoid provoking Japan into any aggression in the southwest Pacific that might harm 
Australia. But as Alexander argued shortly before Pearl Harbor, the conditions for 
Australian-American collaboration in the Pacific had been absent until war broke out 
with Nazi Germany.22 Exemplifying the more pragmatic and strategic outlook, 
Alexander argued that “a conviction of common interest”, far more than “sentiment 
and goodwill”, is a necessary condition of collaboration even between two English-
speaking democracies.  
As this suggests, Australia’s geography began to play a greater role in thinking 
about foreign policy from the 1920s onwards. Distance from Britain, its Imperial 
protector, and proximity to Japan, a long-perceived threat, seemed to compel greater 
attention to the strategic dimensions of the Asia-Pacific region. The “Far East”, or what 
we would today call North East Asia, was a long-standing concern of the Great 
Powers. But the world’s “Far East” was Australia’s “Near North”; and this critical fact 
of geopolitics featured centrally in much writing on Australia’s international affairs. 
Indeed it would eventually compel Australia to work harder on soliciting American 
strategic cooperation in the southwest Pacific. Speaking of the decade before the 
Second World War, Fred Alexander noted the “small but influential school of 
Australian opinion [which] has for years clamored for greater attention to the thought 
and culture of other peoples in Australia’s own geographic region”.23 This had led to 
what he called a “general reorientation of Australian thought toward the Pacific in the 
’twenties and ’thirties”,24 as Australians began to realise and accept America’s 
indispensability to regional stability and Australian security. Pragmatic and strategic 
imperatives triumphed over any lingering suspicions Australians may have harboured 
towards the US.  
During the interbellum period Australia became more aware of the need to develop 
and control its own foreign policy. In 1930 Hancock could write: “In Australia we are 
as a rule hardly conscious that we have a foreign policy.”25 To the extent that there was 
any consciousness at all about Australian foreign policy, it came with “cheerful 
acceptance of a measure of external direction”.26 In fact, “in terms of international law 
the British Empire was a single state”.27 But beginning with the Paris Peace 
Conference, where the irascible and reflexively anti-Wilsonian Prime Minister, W.M. 
                                                 
20 Fred Alexander, Australia and the United States (Boston, 1941), p. 12. 
21 Ibid., pp. 22-5. 
22 Ibid., p. 24.  
23 Ibid., p. 18.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Hancock, Australia, p. 204.  
26 Alexander, Australia and the United States, pp. 19-20.  
27 J.D.B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World (London, 1958), p 25. 
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“Billy” Hughes, made a deep and not altogether positive impression on the 
international delegates, Australia began to exercise greater voice in international 
affairs. Australia’s acquisition of an international voice should not be confused, 
however, with international recognition of independence; Australia persistently refused 
to countenance formal codification of equal status,28 and Dominion signatures were 
only appended to the Versailles Treaty under the name of “British Empire”.29 By the 
mid-1930s, the very idea of an “Australian foreign policy” began to grow in 
plausibility and appeal.30 Still, arguments in favour of an independent Australian 
foreign policy had to be carefully worded to avoid accusations of “anti-Britishness”, as 
Alexander Melbourne confirmed.31  
Despite the care required to articulate an independent foreign policy, it became 
obvious to many, including P.D. Phillips, that the added consideration paid to the 
region was “the first clear demonstration of a positive orientation in external affairs, of 
a release from the intellectual leading strings of European, and particularly English, 
political thinking”.32 But Australian inquiries into international affairs would continue 
to be influenced by two overwhelming facts: that Australia was a member of the 
British Empire and the League of Nations.33 Membership of these two international 
organisations provided Australia with international forums in which to enjoy greater 
independence simultaneously with greater interdependence.  
International Organisations: from the League of Nations to the British Empire and 
Commonwealth  
Over the twenty years that separate the two World Wars, Australia would emerge as an 
independent, sovereign state with all the rights and responsibilities that attach to that 
legal status. Australia despatched its first diplomats to Washington, Tokyo and Ottawa 
in 1940 and participated in the 1945 San Francisco Conference free of the imperial 
obligations that seized it in the Paris Peace Conference. The gradual evolution of 
Australia as a sovereign state with its own foreign policy nonetheless occurred within 
the context of Britain’s imperial institutions. Although at times Australia seemed, by 
comparison with other Dominions, a reluctant bearer of greater independence, the 
Empire’s series of gradual reforms compelled greater consideration of Australia’s 
international obligations to the Commonwealth and its constituent members, and to the 
                                                 
28 Canada and South Africa, by contrast to Australia and New Zealand, felt that “Failure to define the 
principle of equality […] was equivalent to an abandonment of the principle”, see W.K. Hancock, 
Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs – Problems of Nationality, 1918-1936 (Oxford, 1937), 
pp.52-3.  
29 Ibid., p. 86; Miller Commonwealth in the World, p. 36. 
30 Cotton says the first book to carry “Australian Foreign Policy” as its title was Hector Dinning and 
J.G. Holmes, eds, Australian Foreign Policy 1934 (Melbourne, 1935). See Cotton, “Celebrating 75 
Years”, p. 531. 
31 A.C.V. Melbourne, “A Foreign Policy for Australia” in Dinning and Holmes, Australian Foreign 
Policy 1934, p. 22.  
32 Phillips, “Australia in a Changing World”, p. 26.  
33 Gordon Greenwood writes that interwar teaching of IR in Australia emphasised “either 
international machinery or the evolving structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations”, in “The 
Study of International Relations”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 4, 1 (1958), pp. 75-
90 at p. 76. 
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society of states through Australia’s membership of the League of Nations.34 The study 
of international organisation became one of the central themes of interwar IR in the UK 
and USA, and things were no different in Australia, except that unlike the USA, 
Australians also closely studied the British Empire and Commonwealth. Perhaps 
because of its British colonial origins, Australia’s steps towards independence were 
rarely seen as incompatible with membership of a wider international organisation.  
The League Ideals and the Search for Security 
In Britain the League of Nations drew enthusiastic support from prominent academics 
and writers such as Norman Angell, Romanian émigré David Mitrany, Australian-born 
Gilbert Murray, Leonard Woolf, and Alfred Zimmern, to name but a few of the most 
famous internationalists of the day. But the League also drew political support in the 
Dominions from hard-bitten politicians such as Billy Hughes, and the respected South 
African soldier and statesman, Jan Smuts.35 They were, as even E.H. Carr concedes, 
“men of political experience and political understanding” who agreed that peace 
depends on workable international institutions.36 Arguments for “institutional 
internationalism” took a variety of forms, envisioning different degrees of institutional 
integration and centralisation of power, and taking different perspectives on questions 
of dispute resolution, disarmament and collective security. Woolf’s (1916) 
International Government was among the most influential arguments elaborating the 
desirability and feasibility of an international machinery for ordering international 
relations and preventing war, but there were many other late-nineteenth and early 
twentieth century proposals for international reform through legal institutionalisation.37  
Midway through the “twenty years’ crisis”, Fred Alexander published one of the 
most important Australian contributions to the study of international organisation, 
From Paris to Locarno and After.38 This book stands out not only for its quality, but 
for its solitude in Australia. It seems to be the sole Australian contribution of its kind, 
though there were many shorter studies.39  
Alexander, a highly esteemed historian and public intellectual who taught modern 
history at the University of Western Australia, provided a detailed historical account of 
the shifting fortunes of international politics in the decade after the First World War’s 
end. From Paris to Locarno analysed in great detail and with a critical eye the 
dilemmas and decisions that conditioned attempts to build peace out of war. Foregoing 
                                                 
34 For valuable contemporary accounts see Kenneth Bailey, “Australia’s Treaty Rights and 
Obligations” in Persia Campbell, R.C. Mills, and G.V. Portus, eds, Studies in Australian Affairs 
(Melbourne, 1928); and K.C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster, 1931 (Oxford, 1933).  
35 Smuts of course wrote a report on the future League of Nations during the Great War. Hughes was 
lukewarm in his support of the League, believing more in the British Navy than the League, as a 
source of security, according to Hancock.  
36 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (London, 1939), p. 28. 
37 Leonard Woolf, International Government: Two Reports (London, 1916). See also Hidemi 
Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge, 1989); Sylvest, 
“Continuity and Change”; Peter Wilson, The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in 
Twentieth Century Idealism (London, 2003), Ch. 3.  
38 Frederick Alexander, From Paris to Locarno and After: the League of Nations and the Search for 
Security, 1919-1928 (London, 1928). 
39 See F.W. Eggleston, “Collective Security on Trial” in Studies on Australia’s Situation in the 
Pacific: a Collection of Papers Submitted to the Sixth (Melbourne, 1936); and any number of the 
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin.  
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the historical ambition and the reformist internationalism of much contemporary IR, 
Alexander was content to show how the League’s machinery and functioning could not 
be separated from the clash of rival Great Power ideals outside the Palais des Nations. 
The competing Anglo-American and Continental peace plans not only ensured that the 
Covenant would be a product of compromise, but that it would contain ambiguous 
statements and a necessary degree of incompleteness that would shape the League’s 
quest to build international security. Unlike the more inspired theoretical visions 
elaborated by Woolf and his friends, Alexander trained his analytical eye on the actual 
work done, and capable of being done, by the League in the context of international 
events and developments. Though he eschewed the abstractness and idealism that often 
attended earlier discussions of “international government”, Alexander nonetheless 
affirmed that the world is “very much a better place to-day because of the League of 
Nations”.40  
The “Britannic Question”:41 Empire or Liberty? 
Though the League was of enormous interest to Australians, there was rather little 
theoretical engagement with the subject by comparison to the British Empire and 
Commonwealth.42 Australian scholars of the interwar years made a considerable 
contribution to the study of the Empire and Commonwealth, beginning with H. Duncan 
Hall’s seminal British Commonwealth of Nations,43 which was said to have been 
enormously influential on the Balfour Declaration of 1926, K.C. Wheare’s immediately 
authoritative Statute of Westminster, 1931 which went through several revisions and 
editions over the next two decades, and W.K. (Keith) Hancock’s magisterial two-
volume Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, written at the request of Arnold J. 
Toynbee for Chatham House.44 In the third quarter of the century J.D.B. (Bruce) Miller 
was also to make a considerable contribution to Commonwealth studies with two 
important books, and a companion to Hancock’s Chatham House volume, Survey of 
Commonwealth Affairs — Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969.45 Beyond 
making immense contributions to Commonwealth studies, these writings ought to be 
recognised as major contributions to the study of international relations. They were 
never simply studies of the Empire’s “internal” arrangements; rather, they showed the 
Empire, a powerful international actor in its own right, to be something of a Möbius 
strip such that even intra-imperial relations had to be seen as “international” relations, 
well before Dominions achieved sovereign status.  
                                                 
40 Alexander, From Paris to Locarno, p. 157.  
41 I borrow this phrase from the title of Richard Jebb’s book, The Britannic Question: A Survey of 
Alternatives (London, 1913).  
42 As many have previously noted, terminology can be tricky given the changing nomenclature over 
time and competing usage of the terms Commonwealth and Empire – taking them either as opposites, 
or as more or less interchangeable terms, or seeing one institution as part of the other. See Miller, 
Commonwealth in the World, pp. 11-17; Hancock, Argument of Empire, p. 9; and Hancock, Survey of 
British Commonwealth Affairs, Volume 1, pp. 52-62, especially footnote 2 on pp. 53-4. Here I shall 
use “the Commonwealth of Nations” and its abbreviation “the Commonwealth” except where 
historical context requires the use of “British Empire” or “British Commonwealth”.  
43 H. Duncan Hall, British Commonwealth of Nations (London, 1920).  
44 W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Volume 1; and Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs – Problems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939, Volume 2 (London, 1942).  
45 Miller, Commonwealth in the World; Britain and the Old Dominions (London, 1966); idem, Survey 
of Commonwealth Affairs – Problems of Expansion and Attrition (London, 1974). 
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By the First World War’s end, the German, Russian, Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires had all dissolved. What prevented the British Empire from the same 
fate, according to its supporters, was its possession of the “spirit of liberty”, its 
commitment to “national freedom and political decentralisation”.46 But to combat the 
prevailing disintegrative tendencies brought about by colonial nationalisms and ensure 
the Empire’s survival, proponents of “Greater Britain” advanced a range of 
prescriptions from Lionel Curtis’s federative conception of a “great international state” 
to arguments for looser cooperative arrangements such as Alfred Zimmern’s notion of 
an “entente of states”, Richard Jebb’s notion of a “Britannic alliance”, and Smuts’ 
vision of a “Commonwealth of Nations”.47  
The late nineteenth century had seen growing support for the notion of imperial 
federation,48 but it waned in the twentieth, save a few vocal exceptions such as Curtis. 
H. Duncan Hall captured the dominant intellectual mood of the time in averring that 
the Empire was moving along the trajectory of cooperation among independent states, 
creating something akin to the League of Nations.49 Two of the Empire’s most 
prominent statesmen, General Smuts and Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden, had 
already hinted that the British Commonwealth of Nations was an embryonic or 
exemplary “league of nations”.50 In both cases, according to Hall, the guiding principle 
was recognition that peace derives from habits of conference and cooperation among 
free, independent states.51 Many years later Hancock would pass a similar judgment, 
suggesting that both the Commonwealth and the League were “intermingling projects 
of CIVITAS MAXIMA”, societies of states built around “customs and institutions of 
mutual consultation and conference”.52  
Whilst acknowledging the uncertainty of the times, Hall thought this trajectory of 
peaceful international cooperation likely to continue, with Dominions acquiring greater 
independence and responsibility in the process. But the key challenge was how the 
Empire would resolve the ongoing tension between equality of status and imperial 
unity. This would require mutually satisfying arrangements for intra-imperial 
cooperation and clarifying relations between the Empire’s member-states and the rest 
of international society. Crucial to the Empire’s future prospects then was resolving the 
tension between empire and liberty.  
This theme of imperium et libertas (empire and liberty) would reverberate through 
Keith Hancock’s extensive and acclaimed writings on the Commonwealth, especially 
                                                 
46 The quotes come respectively from Alfred Zimmern, The Third British Empire: Being a Course of 
Lectures Delivered at Columbia University (London, 1926), p. 1; and Jan Smuts, The League of 
Nations: Practical Suggestions (London, 1918), p. 9. 
47 Lionel Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature of Citizenship in the 
British Empire, and into the Mutual Relations of the Several Communities Thereof (London, 1916), 
p.2; Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p. 50; Jebb is discussed in Miller, Commonwealth in the 
World, p. 31; Smuts in Hancock, Four Studies of War and Peace in this Century (Cambridge, 1961), 
pp. 102-4. 
48 See for example, J. Anthony Froude, J.R. Seeley, Rawson W. Rawson, England and her Colonies: 
the Five Best Essays on Imperial Federation (London, 1887). 
49 Hall, British Commonwealth of Nations, p. viii.  
50 Ibid., pp. 329-330. 
51 Ibid., Ch. xi.  
52 Hancock, Four Studies of War and Peace, pp. 107-113. For an alternative view see the early essay 
by Hedley Bull, “What is the Commonwealth?”, World Politics, Vol. 11, 4 (1959), pp. 577-587.  
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volume one of his Survey of British Commonwealth. The dilemma of whether and how 
empire and liberty might be reconciled is, of course, an ancient one to which many 
great political thinkers have responded, including Machiavelli, Harrington, Milton and 
Burke among the most illustrious.53 To modern liberals and republicans alike, empire 
and liberty would appear to be incompatible. But as Hancock pointed out, far from 
empire and liberty being antithetical, liberty was the “guiding thread” in the Empire’s 
history,54 the glue which held it together:  
Experience was demonstrating with increasing emphasis that liberty was the cement of empire, 
that each extension of it mitigated irritations, removed frustrations, and liberated an active will for 
partnership in a common way of life. Experience was progressively refuting the maxim that in 
sovereignty there are no gradations.55  
As Hancock perceptively noted, these debates about the means and degrees of imperial 
unity necessarily raised the question of sovereignty and whether it admits of gradation. 
Contrary to Dr Johnson, Hancock believed sovereignty does admit of gradations; the 
British Empire was a living proof.56 This meant that burgeoning Dominion 
independence need not spell the end of imperial interdependence.57  
Empire and liberty were thus not necessarily antithetical; multiplicity and unity 
could be asserted simultaneously, independence could be enjoyed through 
interdependence.58 This, I think, is Hancock’s overarching argument about the Empire 
or Commonwealth — it is a flexible, evolving institution that permits members to find 
both order and liberty through interdependence.59 Hancock constantly sought to 
demonstrate how apparent opposites can be reconciled or mediated: national economic 
planning is best pursued through international cooperation; security is achieved with, 
rather than against, others; “nations can determine themselves either apart or 
together”.60  
In a passage presaging globalization, Hancock reiterated his insightful theoretical 
claim that independence is best pursued through interdependence:  
But now, in a world where the dimensions of space and time are so rapidly shrinking, the success 
of a single nation or continent or even a Commonwealth of Nations must remain precarious unless 
it can find an extension in the international sphere.61 
Recognition that political communities would remain precarious unless integrated into 
international organisations would, in itself, have beneficent effects, Hancock thought.  
It would leaven “snarling nationalism” and “the swollen political pretensions of the 
doctrine of sovereignty” by fostering an “enlightened self-interest” in the principled 
interdependence associated with the Commonwealth and international organisations 
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such as the League and United Nations.62 Interestingly, these ideas would return to 
post-Cold War Australian IR embodied in the form of “good international citizenship” 
and “critical” IR theories.  
It might be said, following J.D.B. Miller, that Commonwealth studies “is not the 
story of international politics at full stretch”.63 Indeed it is not, as the interwar 
development of a more wide-ranging IR in America and the UK shows. But the 
development of Australian IR must be located in its own particular historical and 
political context, one which is dominated by changes in the Empire and 
Commonwealth. Insofar as this involved studying the political consequences of the 
evolving intra- and extra-imperial relations, it plainly addresses relations among 
peoples, nations and states. Indeed, for half of the twentieth century intra-imperial 
relations constituted the majority of Australia’s international relations and determined 
her foreign policy, so it should be no surprise that Australian IR should grow up around 
studies of the Empire and Commonwealth. This probably helps account for the later 
establishment of a disciplinary presence in Australian universities, where political 
scientists, historians and international lawyers were the leading IR scholars, but it does 
not mean that Australians failed to make a contribution to the study of war and peace 
as Miller and Cotton have persuasively argued, contra Bull.64  
Australian IR “Comes of Age”: From War to Cold War 
By the outbreak of the Second World War the League and the optimism of liberal 
internationalism were all but dead. The kind of realism Carr had espoused began to 
strike a chord with those who believed international organizations and the rule of law 
incapable of preserving peace and security in the face of international anarchy. At 
war’s end, Hans J. Morgenthau was reinforcing the critique of utopianism and 
circumscribing the limits of international morality.65 The urgency and importance of 
studying the causes of war and the conditions of peace were undiminished, but a less 
sanguine view of international relations prevailed as the war passed seamlessly into the 
Cold War, with wartime allies (USA and USSR) rapidly becoming peace-time 
enemies. Nonetheless, the commitment to “institutional internationalism” remained 
strong, among scholars as well as practitioners.66  
It is worth noting that Australia was slow, by comparison with the UK and USA, to 
institutionalise the study of politics and international relations in universities. Since the 
turn of the century, university teaching and research of international relations in 
Australia was nurtured across various disciplines, where it was nurtured at all. It was 
not until the University of Melbourne established a Department of Political Science in 
1939 and the Australian National University established a Department of International 
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Relations in 1949 that the Australian disciplines of both Political Science and 
International Relations began to overcome their disparate origins and take shape as 
dedicated disciplines.67 While in the UK and USA many Departments of International 
Relations had been established after 1919, the Australian tendency was to study IR 
within departments of politics, a feature endorsed by Gordon Greenwood, for many 
years the editor of the Australian Journal of Politics and History.68 This 
institutionalisation of IR within departments of politics would persist unchanged into 
the twenty-first century.  
During the war years and the subsequent decade, the leading intellectual concerns in 
Australia were largely a continuation of the interwar years: the foreign policy search 
for security and the international relations of international organisations — the 
Commonwealth and the League’s successor, the United Nations. The “high politics” of 
international diplomacy, alliances, and of course defence and security, were central 
postwar preoccupations. Continuities persisted in Australia’s international outlook, 
evident in the idea of “loyalty to the protector”, in Australia’s commitment to 
international organisation, and in its ongoing anxiety over Japan.69 However, some 
notable changes accompanied these continuities. Australia’s loyalty shifted from 
Britain to the USA; under H.V. Evatt, Australia’s engagement with the UN was more 
vigorously internationalist. These issues were energetically analysed in two leading 
periodicals of the day such as The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin and its successor, the first 
dedicated academic journal of IR, Australian Outlook.70  
In these early post-war years, there was in Australia little effort to produce anything 
like a comprehensive theory of international relations. In this respect, Australian 
scholarship diverged significantly from Britain and America. This would change in the 
1960s when a generation of British-trained Australian scholars (Coral Bell, Hedley 
Bull, Arthur L. Burns, T.B. Millar and J.D.B. Miller) would begin to produce “a 
considerable body of work […] about general and theoretical questions in international 
relations”.71 It is no exaggeration to say that this cohort of scholars put Australian IR 
firmly on the global map. Much of the historiography of the Australian discipline has 
rightly paid attention to the substantial contribution made by this circle of IR scholars 
at the ANU from the 1960s onwards,72 however, one consequence of this post-1960 
focus is a tendency to neglect an important figure in mid-century Australian IR not at 
the ANU, W. Macmahon (Mac) Ball.  
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The Politics of International Relations: Ball, Bull and Bell 
Mac Ball, foundation Professor in Political Science at University of Melbourne, may 
not have been the dazzling scholar that Hancock was but, says Michael Crozier, “he 
was a towering figure” inside and outside the academy in mid-twentieth century 
Australia.73 Outside the academy Ball was subject to heated public attacks by R.G. 
Casey, Minister of External Affairs, for his robust criticism of Prime Minister Menzies’ 
virulent anti-communist rhetoric on China and Vietnam.74 Inside the academy Ball 
occupied the nation’s “first dedicated Chair in Political Science”, according to 
Crozier;75 this perhaps accounts for one of the main differences between interwar IR 
and the kind of IR that would emerge mid-century in Australia: namely, that political 
analysis of events and institutions tended to displace historical analysis. This is not to 
suggest that interwar writings lacked political analysis or that subsequent writings were 
bereft of history; it is merely to note a shift in emphasis.  
Less the historian than the political theorist, Ball’s Possible Peace76 stands as a 
minor, albeit neglected, classic in the Australian IR canon. Published three years before 
E.H. Carr’s theoretical classic, Twenty Years’ Crisis, and one year before Carr’s more 
historical International Relations since the Peace Treaties,77 Ball’s book is an 
impressive combination of theoretical analysis and historical diagnosis of the same 
ground Carr covered in those two books. What it lacked in polemical punch, it more 
than made up for in acute political commentary and analysis of foreign policy, security, 
and international organisation.  
In a manner not dissimilar to Carr, Ball characterised the interwar years as “a 
struggle between a politic of Right, and a politic of Might”; the former embodied in the 
League of Nations’ ideal of “Security, Arbitration, Disarmament”, the latter in the 
Peace Treaties’ desire for “a return to the pre-war anarchy of rival power systems”.78 
The one stands for the rule of international law, the other for the balance of power. Ball 
argued that the Treaty of Versailles failed to apply international law impartially and 
equally. While it may have had the appearance of embodying the rule of law, it actually 
embodied the balance of power, thereby pitching the “League of Victors” against the 
principles and ideals enshrined in the League of Nations. The First World War’s 
winners, it turned out, were more interested in securing everlasting victory over the 
vanquished than in securing a stable peace. “This is the deep tragedy of the League of 
Nations”, says Ball, continuing:  
It has stood for a particular distribution of power between nations, whereas its real work is to 
change the aims for which national power is used. It has stood for a particular ratio of armaments, 
when its work is to reduce all armaments. It has stood for the maintenance of particular frontiers, 
when its real work is to minimize every frontier.79  
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If Carr saw the central problem of international relations as a theoretical clash between 
realism and idealism, Ball saw it as a practical clash within the League of Nations 
between its founding principles and their power-political distortion.  
In another parallel with Carr, Ball regarded with suspicion the claims of self-
determination, nationalism and the nation-state.80 He did not argue that national 
independence and self-determination in themselves were the problem; rather, it was the 
“intense emotions” on which they drew that endangered peace. The nationalism of 
newly-independent states, emerging from failed empires in the early twentieth century, 
often produced “strident assertiveness, blindness to the equal rights of other nations, a 
sense of separateness and exclusiveness, or even a fanatical xenophobia”.81 These were 
the forces which fuelled insecurity, instability and war in Europe during the first half of 
the twentieth century, and which, on Ball’s analysis, were agitating East Asia in the 
1950s.  
Ball’s argument about national self-determination found common ground not only 
with Carr but with his compatriot Hancock. According to Ball, the peacemakers of 
1919 were wrong to exalt national independence; they should have proclaimed “the 
urgency of national interdependence” instead.82 Ball recognised that national self-
determination was a legitimate expression of a people’s freedom, but, picking up on a 
theme elaborated by interwar Australian scholars, emphasised that self-government 
neither absolves a nation of obligations to other nations and peoples, nor does it 
eliminate dependence on those other nations and peoples for security and prosperity. 
There is a mutual dependency that Ball thought cannot be denied and should not be 
ignored. Dependent peoples should thus strive for “interdependence, not 
independence”, Ball contended.83  
Australia’s greatest IR scholar, Hedley Bull, may have been critical of liberal 
notions imputing a transformative power to complex interdependence (of the kinds that 
were propounded in the early twentieth century and again in the 1970s), but he 
nonetheless drew upon a notion of interdependence in his seminal writings. Drawing 
upon a Grotian proposition that states do not exist in isolation and that their well-being 
is inseparable from the rules, norms and institutions formed by a society of states, Bull 
wrote extensively on issues ranging from arms control to the historical expansion of 
international society and questions of justice, just to name a few of his studied themes. 
Across all these themes he held to the conviction that, while states may exist in a 
formal anarchy, that did not preclude their inclusion in a society of states that expresses 
its rules and norms in its own unique institutions.  
Though there is little evidence that Hancock had any direct intellectual influence on 
Bull, the notion that states mutually constitute each other through international society, 
what Hancock analysed as “interdependence”, underpins both men’s ideas about 
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international relations. It is an idea that penetrated the arguments of several other 
scholars present at the ANU during Bull’s tenure and beyond; Carsten Holbraad’s work 
on the Concert of Europe as an informal institution aimed at maintaining international 
order, R.J. Vincent’s work on the rules and norms governing sovereignty and 
intervention, Ian Clark’s work on the dialectic between “Concert” and “Balance” 
practices in maintaining international order, and Paul Keal’s work on “unspoken rules” 
in great power management of international society under conditions of bipolarity.84  
Bull offered structural, functional and historical analyses of international society that 
have been most influential in Britain and Australia, but have also received widespread 
attention in the US recently. His seminal text, The Anarchical Society, was perhaps 
rather slow to make its mark, but some two decades after its publication it has become 
one of the most important and widely cited texts in the discipline. Bull himself has 
emerged as arguably the key thinker of the English School and one of the dominant 
thinkers in the twentieth century study of International Relations.85  
Though rarely numbered among the English School’s membership, Coral Bell, like 
Bull, was deeply influenced by Martin Wight and attended several meetings of the 
British Committee on the Theory of International Politics.86 While US foreign policy 
may have been the immediate focus of many of her books, Bell never lost sight of 
international society, always retaining an emphasis on its conventions, rules, norms and 
institutions.87 Diplomacy and the balance of power were never far from her analyses, 
nor were the normative tendencies that positioned her somewhere between classical 
realism and the English School. The point of difference between Bull and Bell is that 
he tended to focus on the institutions of international society while she tended to focus 
on its (diplomatic) practices. In Conventions of Crisis, for example, she theorises about 
crises with a view to understanding how conventions of crisis management developed 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite being adversaries, Bell shows how crisis 
management conventions cleared a solid common ground on which to temper the 
superpowers’ conflicting interests.88 Though their vitiating effects can never be entirely 
eliminated, Bell argued that if properly managed, crises “may ultimately enable states 
to write the peace treaties without first fighting the wars”.89  
Opening up the Discipline? The Rise of “Low Politics” and Behaviouralism 
In response to world events and in reflection of broader disciplinary developments, the 
Australian discipline began to widen in the 1970s. This was a period in which 
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Australian scholars continued to address traditional foreign policy and security 
concerns, but it was also a period which witnessed significant geopolitical change, 
especially in the region. In the light of Britain’s disengagement east of Suez and the 
USA’s Guam Doctrine in the late 1960s, Australia was forced to take greater 
responsibility for its security in a region that remained unstable, with war continuing in 
Vietnam until 1975, and with China emerging as a great power. The 1970s was also a 
decade during which mounting international significance was attached to the economy 
as Japan and the European Economic Community grew in confidence and stature, and 
as oil crises and Third World demands for global economic justice generated 
international instability. These developments, together with rising environmental 
consciousness and nuclear concerns, prompted calls for widening the discipline of IR 
to include issues and actors traditionally excluded from focus. These calls for IR to 
encompass the full range of global actors and issues followed on earlier calls to employ 
new conceptual tools for the purpose of achieving a more scientific study of 
international relations. It was in this changing international context that Bull made his 
telling interventions into debates on the discipline’s raison d’être, accepting the need to 
rethink the subject-matter of IR and to reflect on method, but demurring on the more 
radical calls for disciplinary renovation.90  
Provoked by the rise of behaviouralism in the 1950s and ’60s, particularly in the 
USA, Bull’s article on “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit” was an 
attempt to delineate the subject-matter of IR and to lay out a research agenda based on 
a method he had previously referred to as “the classical approach”.91 While IR may 
have had a subject-matter focussed on relations among states, it lacked its own 
distinctive method, he observed. In fact, IR was a “scene of contending approaches and 
techniques”, most clearly expressed in the differences between the American academy 
on the one hand and the British and Australian on the other.92 Bull associated the 
“classical tradition” with “an approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, 
history, and law”, one that jettisons the quest for scientific certitude, favouring instead 
the exercise of political judgment.93 This hermeneutic or interpretive approach makes 
no pretension to reduce political complexity and historical contingency into theoretical 
laws or models. Rather, it takes as its point of departure the historical bodies of 
“international” thought that have informed both theory and practice, stretching from 
Thucydides through Machiavelli, Grotius, Hobbes, Vattel, Burke and Kant, to Angell, 
Zimmern, Carr, Morgenthau and Wight.94 
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The scientific approach, by contrast, was dominated by the aspiration to establish a 
theory “whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or 
upon strict, empirical procedures of verification”.95 Though predominantly an 
American movement, one of the leading behaviouralists of the 1960s was an 
Australian, Arthur L. Burns, who published his sophisticated theoretical writings in 
leading American journals. For Burns, as for Morton Kaplan, the target of Bull’s 
critique, behaviouralism was intended to deliver a more rigorous theoretical account of 
“system and process in international politics”, to borrow Kaplan’s book title.96 
According to this view, the subject-matter of IR was rightly focused on states, security, 
and the balance of power; but, as Burns sought to show, IR could learn greatly from 
game-theoretic insights and economic theory.97 Bull, however, remained unconvinced 
by such aspirations, believing that where practitioners of the scientific approach have 
produced revealing insights it is by “stepping beyond the bounds” of their scientific 
methods.98 Ultimately, Bull adjudged the scientific approach unlikely to contribute 
much to a theory of international relations because its scientism fails to grasp the 
political significance of rules, norms, and moral values on the one hand, and history on 
the other. Eschewing the scientism then prominent in American IR, Bull persisted in 
his “classical” approach to IR, writing insightfully on strategic studies, the changing 
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, great power responsibility, and justice, all 
subjects of a traditionally conceived discipline.99  
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the “behaviouralist revolt” was far 
from monolithic. While some, such as Kaplan and Burns, were content to accept IR’s 
focus on “high politics”, states and the states-system, others employed behaviouralism 
to include “low politics” in the discipline’s focus and multiply its conceptual tools by 
embracing inter-disciplinarity. These inter-disciplinary approaches were self-
consciously progressive or radical, aiming to challenge the state-centric, power-
political and institutional focus of IR as conventionally studied. In the writings of John 
Burton, for example, the traditional boundaries of IR were substantially broadened to 
accommodate new theoretical methods capable of encompassing “high” and “low 
politics”, war and peace studies, international politics and international economics. 
While recognising the value of classical approaches to previous times, Burton, for 
example, believed that new times demanded new theories. In a brief discussion of the 
so-called “second great debate”, he argued that contemporary phenomena required new 
behaviouralist and sociological methods and inter-disciplinary analysis to take better 
account of the way world society is changing.100 Indeed, according to Burton, one of 
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the defining features of contemporary world politics is its “dynamic” quality, 
something which IR, in its focus on “static” structures and institutions, failed to 
understand.101 From Burton’s perspective, the point was to move beyond the traditional 
concept of state-as-actor, and to see the state as a dynamic site of multiple interactions 
and transactions. This also entailed replacing the state as the fundamental unit of 
analysis with “world society”, which takes the appearance of numerous global 
“cobwebs” individually and collectively facilitating interactions and transactions across 
multiple intersecting fields of social activity, and flowing across state boundaries.  
Burton’s internationally influential approach found favour with two young 
Australian scholars in the 1970s, Ralph Pettman and Joseph Camilleri. They took the 
study of international relations in a radically different direction to both Burns and Bull, 
expanding its scope to include actors and processes beyond the traditional disciplinary 
boundaries, and adopting a trans- or inter-disciplinary approach better able to account 
for the multiple pathologies afflicting the human condition in the modern age. Of 
central importance was the claim that behaviouralism enables various levels and 
systems to be integrated into a single theoretical perspective. Pettman showed how 
behaviouralism shifts attention upwards to the level of the global system at the same 
time as it shifts attention downwards to the level of individual and group behaviour.102 
Camilleri showed how the many pathologies of contemporary world politics (economic 
inequality, environmental degradation, social conformism, and militarism) could be 
drawn together and analysed in a single theoretical framework concerned with 
constructing a peaceful and just world order.103 Much like the contemporaneous World 
Order Models Project led by Richard Falk, with which it had a close affinity, 
Camilleri’s project was openly “utopian”, focusing on the inter-related struggles for 
peace and justice across the multiple levels of world society.104 In Burton, Camilleri, 
and to a lesser degree in Pettman, we can see the theme of interdependence deployed as 
part of an explicit normative programme.  
In the face of these interdisciplinary approaches, Bull’s focus and approach were 
perceived to be decidedly traditional, conservative even. But Bull’s position has, in at 
least three ways, been vindicated by subsequent disciplinary developments. Firstly, at 
the very least, it is clear that IR remains an intellectual battleground between those who 
aspire to scientific verisimilitude and those who abandon such hopes, positivists and 
post-positivists as they were respectively called in the 1980s and ’90s. Secondly, post-
positivist inquiries into the relationship between knowledge and values are consistent 
with Bull’s efforts to restore “norms, rules and moral values to the central place in the 
study of International Relations”.105 Thirdly, although Bull himself tended to focus on 
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the states-system he was well aware that it existed in a wider global system comprising 
state and non-state actors, structures and processes.106 In fact, given the widespread 
agreement on these three points, it is almost as if Bull did resolve the debate in the 
minds of most Australian scholars of IR. For even though many would take issue with 
his substantive contribution, they would themselves continue to engage with 
philosophy, history and law — the component parts of Bull’s traditional approach — to 
conduct their inquiries into international relations.107 In any case, the unresolved 
methodological questions canvassed by Bull fed directly into the so-called “third great 
debate”, a debate in which many Australian scholars were to play lead roles.  
Australian IR after the Cold War: the “Post-Positivist Turn” 
The end of the Cold War not only spawned a number of celebratory and cautionary 
arguments about future world orders, it also raised questions about the capability of 
both realism and liberalism to understand and explain the changing architecture of 
world politics. Implosion of the superpower rivalry in addition to the advent of 
globalization seemed to confirm Walker’s late-Cold War conjecture that conventional 
theoretical categories were “out of joint with the times”.108 At any rate, the 
efflorescence of globalization and the dramatic breach of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 
seemed consonant with the breach of the disciplinary wall erected around IR, though 
admittedly manifestations of popular dissent and disciplinary transgression were 
noticeable in the mid-1980s. In what became known as the “third great debate”, global 
political transformation became the backdrop to post-positivist questioning of orthodox 
international theories. Before surveying the post-positivist “era of critical diversity”, 
and particularly the place of Australian scholarship within it, it will be useful to recall 
the changing Australian outlook on globalization and the post-Cold War international 
order.  
In response to globalization and the collapse of the Cold War, Australia, like many 
other countries, redefined its self-image and its international outlook. Australia was no 
longer an insecure British outpost in the southwest Pacific.109 Growing self-confidence 
encouraged a reconsideration of Australia’s multiple locations (South Pacific, Asia-
Pacific, Indian Ocean, global), identities (Western, multicultural, liberal democratic) 
and interests (strategic, economic and historical). Two dominant themes emerged in the 
Hawke-Keating governments’ (1983-1996) efforts to reconceptualise the national 
interest in line with the confident new self-image: greater “engagement” with an 
economically dynamic Asian region, and the concept of “good international 
citizenship”. The government-commissioned Garnaut Report advised that Australia 
should reorient its foreign and economic policies to North East Asia if it is to remain 
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economically competitive and prosperous in the longer-term.110 This was advice on 
which the Australian government needed no persuading, and was evidence of a greater 
willingness to consider the national interest and security in terms of international 
political economy.111 Further revision of the national interest commenced under the 
concept of “good international citizenship”. Advanced by Foreign Minister, Gareth 
Evans, to capture Australia’s commitment to the evolution of a more cooperative, just 
and rule-governed international order, this doctrine seized the interest of several 
Australian scholars who saw in this idea of “enlightened self-interest” a pragmatic but 
ethically-informed framework for formulating Australian foreign policy, one that pays 
a debt to earlier versions of Australian “institutional internationalism”.112  
Closely related to these arguments was the notion that Australia needed to 
reformulate its identity as a middle power capable of international leadership by 
initiating and building coalitions around specific issues of national and international 
interest.113 Australia’s foreign policy commitment to multilateralism and what Hancock 
called “habits of conference and cooperation” once again seemed to chime with IR 
theories committed to granting rules, norms and moral values a central place in world 
politics, and to acknowledging the state’s potential to act as a positive force, even as 
others declaimed the crisis of the sovereign state.114 In all these Cold War- and 
globalization-induced changes to the global architecture, two tenets earned widespread 
agreement: firstly, Australia’s identity and agency as a state are inextricably related to 
regional and global predicaments; secondly, that Australia’s security and prosperity lie 
in a commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation. These tenets 
reaffirmed the international outlook expressed by earlier generations of Australian IR 
— that Australia’s interests are best served through the maintenance of strong ties of 
interdependence.  
This persistent theme of interdependence in Australia’s international outlook betrays 
a certain distance from realism that is as evident in the history of Australian foreign 
policy as it is in Australian IR theory. Even during the Cold War years Australian IR 
theory never fully embraced the realist orthodoxy — as we have seen, Ball, Bull and 
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Bell retained an analytical commitment to rules, norms and moral values, and Burton, 
Camilleri and Pettman undertook more radical and normative critiques of world order. 
Since the Cold War’s end and even in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks of 2001, Australian IR theorists have deepened and extended their engagement 
with the English School theory of international society,115 and expressed strong 
criticism of the War on Terror’s threat to a rules-based international order.116 A pre-
occupation with interdependence, in one sense or another, and a suspicion towards both 
power-political realism and scientific theory, have continued to shape Australian IR 
theory through what became known as the “third great debate”. In fact, little has 
changed other than the diversification and sophistication of Australian IR theory.  
The “Third Great Debate”: Australian Perspectives 
The “third great debate” manifested itself in a theoretical profusion received by some 
as perturbing and others as something to be celebrated.117 The heart of this debate was a 
confrontation between positivism and its post-positivist critics. In many ways, it was a 
reprisal of the second great debate as framed by Bull since it pitted scientific against 
non-scientific approaches. There are some significant differences, however, not least 
that in the latest incarnation of great debates, it was the non-scientific approach which 
sought to restructure international theory by introducing inter-disciplinary theoretical 
techniques and methods. If in the 1960s and ’70s behaviouralism promised new 
insights into world politics, it was theories informed by the “interpretive turn” that 
promised new insights into the globalizing and post-Cold War worlds of the 1990s. 
This was true of the full spectrum of post-positivist theories which challenged 
mainstream IR theories, from the more radical “critical theories” (of post-structuralism, 
postcolonialism, feminism, Critical Theory and Constructivism) to revitalised versions 
of realism and international society theory. Australian IR saw all these theories flourish 
in the 1990s.  
Post-positivist theories can be understood to comprise two broad elements: firstly, 
theoretical reflexivity, second, normative reflection. These can be broken down further. 
Theoretical reflexivity incorporates interpretive theory and social constructivism; 
normative reflection involves engaged criticism of prevailing social and political 
realities and inquiry into emancipatory potentials.  
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Theoretical Reflexivity: Interpretation and Social Construction 
In his major contributions to the “third debate”, Jim George identifies two precepts of 
orthodox IR theory that post-positivism rejects: firstly, the empirico-positivist notion 
that theorizing is primarily a cognitive response to an external world of facts; and 
second, the denial of theory’s “world-making” or constitutive properties.118 Against 
empirico-positivism George argues that theory and practice, knowledge and the world, 
facts and values, are interdependent. Lest it be thought that only critical theories 
engage in a critique of empirico-positivism, Martin Griffiths and Roger Spegele both 
endorse the critique in the process of defending revised versions of realism, and Alex 
Bellamy endorses the “rise of constructivism” in his defence of the English School’s 
theory of international society.119 Common to all these approaches is a suspicion of the 
Cartesian split between words and worlds, facts and values. This anti-Cartesianism 
underpins the interpretive or linguistic turn in social and political theory, which draws 
on deep intellectual lineages that extend from Immanuel Kant to Jürgen Habermas, 
Friedrich Nietzsche to Jacques Derrida. It is risky to generalise on this complex 
intellectual development, but, the linguistic turn contends that language expresses a 
way of being in the world, and the world (social reality) is partly constituted in and 
through language. This leads to a view commonly known as “social constructivism” — 
the view that social and political realities do not exist independently of the discourses 
(words, concepts, and categories of understanding) used by individuals, politicians, 
diplomats, and activists in society. Words and worlds are interdependent; or, put 
differently, international relations are discursively constructed.  
Again, it should be noted that commitment to realism’s rehabilitation does not 
necessarily preclude acceptance of reality’s interpretive and constructed nature. 
Griffiths draws upon the interpretive theories of Max Weber, Karl Mannheim and R. 
N. Berki to disaggregate different conceptions of “reality”.120 He is under no illusion 
that international “reality” is immediate, necessary or true and is persuaded that 
“ontological assumptions” determine how international politics is conceptualised. We 
cannot appeal “to some ‘objective’ reality independent of its intersubjective 
constitution by the actors involved”, says Griffiths, but must exercise “interpretive 
reason” to understand and explain international relations.121 This leads him to posit a 
constructivist view of international anarchy against the naturalistic views of 
Morgenthau and Waltz. According to Griffiths, the international struggle for power is 
not a “given”, it is a “variable”.122 In this interpretation he explicitly aligns himself with 
Bull’s approach which sees international relations as an essentially contested and 
historically contingent realm of human practices.123  
Interpretivist and constructivist elements are also prominent in Constructivism and 
post-structuralism. American Constructivist Alexander Wendt famously argued that 
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“anarchy is what states make of it”.124 The structure of anarchy in itself does not cause 
power politics. In The Moral Purpose of the State, Chris Reus-Smit provides an 
historical validation of this claim by showing how changing institutional practices 
generated by international society depend on evolving intersubjective beliefs about the 
state’s moral purpose.125 His self-consciously Constructivist account proceeds through 
a close examination of Ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, absolutist Europe, and the 
modern international society, revealing how different constitutional structures and their 
foundational values govern these international societies. David Campbell’s two hugely 
influential books, Writing Security and National Deconstruction, show how states are 
performatively constituted through various acts of domestic and foreign policy.126 
Rather than posit the state as a fully-formed, bounded actor, Campbell’s post-
structuralism emphasises the ongoing political practices which found and maintain a 
state and its identity. Roland Bleiker and Anthony Burke have applied these post-
structuralist insights in fine studies of Korea’s and Australia’s international outlook 
respectively.127  
Normative Reflection: Critique and Emancipation 
Where the various critical theories tend to depart from the revised forms of realism it is 
in the intellectual commitments to critique and emancipation. However, while Spegele 
and Griffiths argue against idealism of various kinds, they should not be taken to reject 
ethical or normative reflection altogether; both are clearly disposed to forms of realism 
capable of evaluation. Griffiths identifies evaluation as an inescapable dimension of 
realism, while Spegele advocates an “ethical realism” committed to tolerance, 
democracy and value-pluralism.128 Having said this, critical theories differ from realism 
in that they see critique and emancipation as defining the purpose of studying 
international relations. The Habermasian-inspired Critical Theory pioneered by 
Andrew Linklater, a Scot who taught in Australian universities between 1976 and 
1992, adopts the theoretical reflexivity outlined above to offer a critical analysis of 
prevailing world orders with a view to identifying immanent potentials for 
emancipatory change. It not only offers a critique of the dogmatism it sees in 
mainstream IR theories, it seeks to “denaturalize” extant structures and practices of 
domination and exclusion. Linklater has developed a powerful philosophical critique of 
the sovereign state as an exclusionary form of political community in a trilogy of 
seminal books which has been influential on a younger generation of Australian 
theorists.129 Another impressive trilogy, by Vendulka Kubálková and Albert 
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Cruikshank, has unfortunately had little impact on the Australian discipline, but it 
should be noted for its considerable contribution to a Marxist analysis and critique of 
IR.130  
An equal concern with critique and emancipation is evident in feminism and 
postcolonialism, though the element of critique is arguably more prominent than 
emancipation. In many respects, feminism and postcolonialism offer the most radical 
approaches to IR in that they both seek to re-interpret international relations “from the 
‘ground up’”.131 By asking, “where are the women in international relations?”, 
feminists highlight the way that how one conceives the world cannot be separated from 
where one is located in that world. Moreover, this pointed question alerts us to the 
relations of power and structures and practices of exclusion that shape international 
relations in ways “gender-blind” theories cannot comprehend.132 As Jan Jindy Pettman 
and Katrina Lee-Koo have amply demonstrated, women’s experiences of the 
international cannot be assimilated to men’s experiences; women’s experiences will 
vary depending on their location, race, class and so on, but power and exclusion tend to 
remain salient factors wherever women are located, especially when peace gives way 
to conflict and war.133  
This sensitivity to the local or “domestic” experiences of men, women and children 
is also expressed in postcolonialism’s focus on the positions and voices of those 
excluded and marginalised by the process and legacy of colonialism. Postcolonialism 
challenges the empirico-positivist notion of objective or neutral knowledge, 
deliberately aiming to unsettle Western universalist conceits by asking, “who speaks?” 
Phillip Darby, who has been one of the leading exponents of postcolonial theory in IR, 
has powerfully criticized the discipline’s Western bias and failure to attend to the 
tensions between tradition and modernity, North and South in world politics.134 Similar 
lines of argument have been developed by Paul Keal, Brett Bowden and Bruce Buchan 
who have used the historical body of international law to re-tell the story of European 
international society’s global expansion through colonization and dispossession.135 
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Together, feminism and postcolonialism encourage greater sensitivity to the way 
different subjectivities (white western males and black female postcolonial subjects, for 
example) experience the realities of power and domination in international relations. 
Though they retain a commitment to emancipation, it is focused on the plight of 
particular segments of humanity rather than humanity as a whole.  
Conclusion 
This survey suggests that a single Australian outlook on international affairs cannot be 
identified. However, there are two themes that stand out in the intellectual formation of 
Australian outlooks on international affairs. Firstly, the enduring theme of 
interdependence; and secondly, notwithstanding a few important exceptions, the 
repeated scepticism expressed towards power-political realism and scientific theories. 
Without wishing to reduce the history of Australian IR theory to a Grotian 
preoccupation with interdependence, there is nonetheless a remarkable persistence in 
the theme, even if it is interpreted and grasped in competing ways. Hancock made a 
point of emphasizing interdependence in international relations, but it is present in 
subtle ways in the thinking of otherwise diverse thinkers as Mac Ball, Coral Bell, 
Hedley Bull, John Burton, Joseph Camilleri, Andrew Linklater, and Chris Reus-Smit, 
to name just a few of Australia’s most prominent IR theorists. Not surprisingly, the 
emphasis on interdependence has also been closely tied to what Bull called the 
“traditional approach” to theorizing which emphasizes interpretation and the normative 
constitution of international relations. Australian outlooks on international affairs, 
insofar as they can be discerned, tend to exhibit a preference for more interpretive 
approaches drawing on history, law and political philosophy. The consequence of 
adopting such an approach is an active consideration of the rules, norms and moral 
values which bind states together in an interdependent society of states. This is 
discernible not just in Australian IR theory but also, in varying degrees, Australian 
foreign policy from the 1920s onwards.  
Finally, how should we assess Bull’s judgment about the quality of interwar IR 
theory? Are Australian contributions to IR theory before the discipline “came-of-age” 
in the 1960s worth reading now for any reason beyond throwing light on the 
preoccupations of the times? Surely the answer must be “yes”, at least insofar as an 
interpretive approach is adopted. Bull’s judgment here rests on the possibility of neatly 
distinguishing between theory and the history of theory. But his own writing has done 
much to discredit that distinction, showing how examination of the past, its theories as 
much as its practices, helps us come to a better understanding of the present. In Bull’s 
own words, “theory itself has a history”, and necessarily bestows legacies at the same 
time that it inherits debts.136  
This article is a small contribution to more comprehensive attempts to narrate the 
rich history of Australian IR theory and to record some of the intellectual debts and 
inheritances that have gone towards shaping and reshaping an Australian outlook. To 
that end, efforts to reveal and recover early Australian contributions to IR must be seen 
as being of more than simply historical interest. Acquaintance with the history of 
Australian international thought may yield more historically-sensitive and 
conceptually-informed insights into present formations of an Australian outlook on 
international affairs.  
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